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THE SUPREME COURT AND MILITARY DUTY

O N MAY 28, 1931, the Supreme Court of the United States

decided the case number 504 on their term docket, the
case of the United States v. MacIntosh,l which had been
much discussed in the newspapers and of which the decision
had been eagerly awaited.
The facts are doubtless familiar enough. Mr. Douglas
Clyde MacIntosh, an ordained Baptist clergyman and professor of Theology at Yale University, a Canadian by birth,
sought to be admitted to United States citizenship. He had
fulfilled all the formal requirements and was ready to take
the oath prescribed by the statute which governs the naturalization of foreigners. But in expressing his readiness to
take the oath, he declared that he understood it in a special
way, that is, that he understood it not to impose upon him
the duty of bearing arms or indeed of "supporting" the
country in war, unless he believed the war to be morally
justified.
Citizenship was refused and he appealed to the courts,
going as he was bound to do, first to the Federal District
Court 2 of one Judge, then to the Circuit Court of Appeals 3
of three and finally to the Supreme Court 4 in which nine
judges considered the case. All in all, therefore, thirteen
federal judges have passed upon the matter. If we were
merely to count them we should find that seven judges decided that Mr. Macintosh was legally qualified to be an
American citizen and that six judges decided that he was
not. Nor would any one say that the seven in question,
Justices Manton, Learned Hand, Swan, Hughes, Stone,
Holmes and Brandeis, were all inferior in ability to the other
six.
None the less, because of the way in which these thirteen
judgments were distributed, Mr. MacIntosh was not admitted to citizenship. The majority of the Supreme Court,
Justices Sutherland, McReynolds, Van DeVanter, Butler
1283 U. S. 605, 51 Sup. Ct. 570 (1930).
2 Not reported.
'Macintosh v. United States, 42 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A., 2d, 1930).
'Supra note 1.

THE SUPREME COURT AND MILITARY DUTY

39

and Roberts found that he was not "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States" 5 and that
the oath he was willing to take, as he interpreted it, was not
the oath required of him by the Naturalization Act, Section
4, Chapter 3592.6
It would be very easy to declare roundly that the majority for whom Justice Sutherland spoke was quite wrong
and that the minority who concurred in Justice Hughes'
opinion was quite right. Certainly Justice Hughes' opinion
has a nobler, finer ring than Justice Sutherland's. It will
also be called less "technical"-to use a quite meaningless
term of opprobrium-although, in fact, it is not in the least
less technical. We may add that it is better written. Further, it cannot be gainsaid that Mr. MacIntosh is a man of
exceptionally high quality, of higher quality, in Justice
Hughes' words, than a "host far less worthy" " who are annually admitted to citizenship. Perhaps, as was said in a much
more ancient naturalization case, he is of the sort to be
eagerly invited into our citizenship, if he had not voluntarily
sought it.
Is it a love of "technicality" that makes a court, when
it discovers that a man is of this description, look beyond
that fact into statutes, decisions, reasons, rules, exceptions,
basic principles and logical inferences? Doubtless many will
think so, since there is no more fruitful course of nonsense
than the term "technicality" in the mouths of persons who
rarely take the trouble to think precisely or painstakingly.
It may be said quite soberly that if there are weaknesses in
either the majority or the minority opinion, it is not that
either is too technical, but that neither is technical enough.
Evidently no one desires that naturalization shall at
once take place when we come to the conclusion that the applicant is a fine fellow. Without constitutions and statutes,
we should find that method a little vague, a little loose and
perhaps even a little dangerous. At any rate, it is not open
to us to use it. We have constitutions and statutes which
require us to do differently. It is said that any Giaour
5

Supra note 1 at 613, 51 Sup. Ct. at 571.
U. S. C. A. Tit 8 Sec. 372 et seq.
1 at 629, 51 Sup. Ct. at 577.

7 Supra note
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may become a Moslem merely by reciting aloud: "There is
no God but Allah" and so following, and doubtless that
method works well enough. We make things somewhat
harder, and, whether to our advantage or disadvantage, we
ask many more things of men who deserve to be citizens of
the United States.
Mr. Sutherland declares that Mr. MacIntosh may not
become a citizen of the United States, because he will not
agree to bear arms in any war that does not justify itself to
his conscience, whereas he might legally be required to bear
arms whether the war did so justify itself or not. Mr. Hughes
retorts that the Naturalization Statute does not either directly or indirectly require him to bear arms in any war.
Mr. Sutherland is sure that a man who declares that it must
rest with his own private judgment whether he will or will
not fight for his country, is not attached to the principles
of the Constitution of the United States, as the Statute requires him to be. Mr. Hughes is of the opinion that the
defence of the country against foes, domestic and foreign,
which the statutory oath demands, can be carried on without
fighting.
A debate between Judges of the Supreme Court is for
the generality of Americans, legal or lay, a battle between
giants, but, even if we allow for the diffidence that becomes
all of us in the presence of such high argument, it may be
questioned whether either of the contestants has really met
the issue technically and, if the matter is not to be dealt
with technically, it has no business before a court at all.
There is the statute before us. Parts of it are quoted
verbatim and it is indicated that any one who wishes to read
it all in detail can do so conveniently by looking up the volume called United States Code, Title 8, Section 372 and the
following, or volume 34 of the Statutes at Large, page 596
and the following. It appears that besides many smaller
details which are irrelevant, it is required that the applicant
"be attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the' same," and it is further required that he will
declare on oath that he "will support and defend the Con-
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stitution and laws of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic."
Now, although it is easy enough to find these words, it
is not by any means easy to understand them. And the difficulty is just that the first requirement, instead of being expressed in technical and precise language, is expressed in
sonorous, literary and rhetorical terms. Justice Sutherland
asserts that Mr. MacIntosh does not meet this first requirement, but if he were talking technically and precisely, he
would first tell us what the principles of the Constitution
are and how he recognizes them; how he tests attachment
or lack of attachment; and how he could answer those who
find that the principles of the Constitution are complete individual liberty and the recognition of the individual conscience and who assert an undying attachment to these
principles. No, Chief Justice Hughes is quite right in dealing with these words respectfully, but lightly. They are not
much help to law or administration, being emotional or
ornamental, rather than significant. They warm our hearts
without illuminating our path. I suppose a person who intended to destroy the United States as a political unit, or to
erect an absolute monarchy here could not honestly declare
his attachment to the principles of the Constitution. But
there is scarcely a shade of opinion short of these extremes
whose defenders could not show themselves to be as attached
to the principles of the Constitution as Justice Sutherland,
and there is little indication in the majority opinion that
Justice Sutherland would be able to refute them.
But the other requirement is more definite. Does defending the Constitution require the use of arms? Justice
Hughes says "No," and points out now many other ways
there are in which the Constitution has been and may be
defended. Doubtless Congress could declare war as it
pleases, and doubtless it could try to compel American citizens to fight whether they liked the war or not. This is the
burden of Justice Sutherland's opinion. But no one doubts
it and Justice Hughes concedes it at the beginning. Perhaps
Congress could have required the duty to bear arms as a
condition of naturalization. The question is whether Congress has in fact done so, and it is hard to meet the minority
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contention that to ask the candidate for citizenship to defend the Constitution, does not necessarily imply that he
must defend it by arms and not otherwise.
But, after all, that is not the only thing that the statute
says. The applicant must "support" as well as "defend" the
Constitution. Justice Hughes declares that every official is
required to announce this support and it has never been
supposed it implied the bearing of arms. But Justice Hughes
does not note that in the Naturalization oath there is a
phrase which does not occur in the official oath. The petitioner for naturalization must swear to support the statutes
as well as the Constitution.
This, it seems to me, is the issue over which the opponents might properly have locked horns. If it were on the
basis of disaffection to Constitutional principles or on the
refusal to bear arms that Mr. MacIntosh is to be excluded,
as Justice Sutherland asserts, few will deny that Justice
Hughes succeeds in reducing these reasons to so fine a degree of tenuousness that they may be said to disappear. But
supporting the laws of the United States must mean at least
doing nothing to prevent their enforcement. May we reasonably infer that Mr. MacIntosh would in this sense support a
statute of Congress, declaring a morally unjustified war?
Mr. MacIntosh is an extremely honest man. He has indicated it in his conduct, since by a very slight disingenuousness-the merest soupcon of it-he might have saved himself
all this pother. I think we may assume that if Congress
declared a morally unjustifiable war, he means us to understand that he would not fight in it, even if he were specifically by statute required to do so; and that he would not
only disobey it, but refuse it any countenance whatsoever.
Indeed, his disobedience and his example would actively
hinder the war, and of this fact he could not but be conscious.
Now, if a law requiring him to fight-that is, a law refusing persons like him an exemption based on their religious
scruples-is a law of the United States, he has not fulfilled
the obligation which the Naturalization Statute seeks to
impose on him.
Two things are clear. Certainly there is no such statute
at present in force in the United States; and equally cer-
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tainly Congress could, if it chose, pass such a statute. Consequently, we are left with the question whether a law which
Congress might in the future pass is now a law of the United
States-within the sense which reasonable men will give to
the statutory requirement.
It will evidently not do to 8ay that an applicant for
citizenship promises merely to support existing laws and
not those that may be passed in the futue. Does it follow
then that he must support every conceivable law that Congress in the exercise of its Constitutional power may pass,
no matter how unreasonable, whimsical or harmful the law
is? Most citizens, if they search their consciences, will not
go so far.
It is not a matter of obeying the laws. Every citizen
must obey the laws, and his obligation to do so comes from
his status as a citizen. It is neither enlarged nor strengthened, when, in addition, he specifically promises to obey.
If he does not obey, he must accept the penalties imposed.
It is for that reason that an officer of the United States
swears to uphold the Constitution, but does not swear to
obey the laws. It is taken as a matter of course that he will
obey them or take the consequences.
But "supporting" the laws is more than obeying them;
at any rate, it is a reasonable construction of the words to
hold that it is. The really important thing is to be sure of
the other element of our question. Does the Naturalization
law demand of Mr. MacIntosh that he support a law which
does not now exist, but which well may exist at some indefinite future time?
Surely, it is too much to ask his support of any conceivable law. It is not his obedience that is demanded-that is
taken for granted-but something over and above obedience.
Is there any American who will undertake to promise his
encouragement to every law that Congress might possibly
enact? Will Secretary Mellon support a dole, should Congress enact it? Will the economic bulwarks of our polity,
the heads of our power companies and our banks, support
widows' pensions, unemployment insurance, large increases
in the income sur-tax or in the upper ranges of the inheritance tax schedules? And since the amending power is part
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of the Constitution, will these same gentlemen, for whose
legitimate interests judges-even Supreme Court Judgesare often and quite properly concerned, will they promise to
support confiscatory statutes that may be passed if an amendment to this effect is made? Surely it is not impertinent to
declare that it is more than doubtful.
We may go further. There are tax statutes actually in
existence which propertied gentlemen have been heard unmeasuredly to denounce. There is a Prohibition statute,
passed in accordance with a recent Amendment, which some
millions of Americans, reputable and disreputable, actively
disobey, or enable others to disobey. If Mr. MacIntosh had
been asked: "Will you support and defend the Volstead
Act from all enemies, foreign and domestic?" would he have
been refused if he had said "No"?
The number of our Statutes at Large is vast. Some of
them are picayune, foolish and bad. We cannot ask of any
person that he support them all. Evidently, that is not what
the Naturalization Act must mean. It must mean that he
shall promise to support the important statutes-at any rate
most of them-and we must ask ourselves whether a statute
declaring war and requiring military service of Mr. MacIntosh in a war he deemed morally unjustifiable-is a statute
of this sort.
That there is no such statute now, is, as has been said,
not conclusive. But if it is true that it is highly unlikely
that Congress will pass such a statute, then we may, as sensible persons, agree that anything which is highly unlikely to
happen is not important.
Justice Hughes strongly asserts that no such statute is
likely to be passed; and he bases his assertion on the fact
that no such statute has ever been passed. On previous occasions, as happened most recently in 1917, when military
service was generally required, there have always been exceptions, and in every case one of the exceptions has had
something to do with conscientious religious scruples.
Surely, it cannot be denied that what Congress has never
done when it had a chance, Congress will not be likely to
do in the future, if the chance should come again.
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But Justice Hughes says too much when he declares
that it is highly unlikely that persons who hold Mr. MacIntosh's views will fail to be exempted in any future Draft
Act. Our most recent Draft Act, that of 1917, made special
mention of men who had conscientious scruples against bearing arms. If we may credit report, our conscientious objectors had, in spite of the law, a rather bad time of it-and
there are respectable and well-meaning citizens who are
sorry it was not harder. But the Act certainly exempted
them, just as previous Acts had exempted others with them.
But would Mr. MacIntosh have come within the exemption? Justice Hughes assumes that he would have. Yet
the Act exempted only those who had conscientious scruples
against military service of any sort. Suppose, in 1917, a
conscript had declared that he had no objection to military
service, but that he objected to serving in this particular
war because he deemed it morally unjustifiable. Would he
have been exempted? There is reason to believe that his
induction into the service would have been somewhat
accelerated.
Now, that is Mr. MacIntosh's position. He has no conscientious scruples against bearing arms, and he therefore
does not clearly come within the exemption of our most recent and most elaborate Draft Act. If another Act is ever
passed, it must be admitted that there is no reason to think
it will extend the exemptions to any great extent; and certainly there is no reason to suppose that it will specifically
cover Mr. MacIntosh's case.
I have left out all reference to the Schwimmer case 8
which Justice Sutherland cites in support of his judgment.
One reason is that as an American I am somewhat ashamed
of it and I had hoped that no one would ever mention it
again. In that astounding decision six Justices of the Supreme Court declared that a woman who would be past military age, even if she had been a man, could not become an
American citizen, because she declared she would not do
what it was almost inconceivable to believe any statute
would ever ask her to do.
8

United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448 (1929).
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Justice Hughes noticed the Sehwimmer case, only with
the consecrated phrase with which courts administer euthanasia to their non-viable progeny: he said it stood on its
own facts. That usually means that the case will not stand
at all, in law, or in logic, or in common sense.
But a better, because more technical, reason for disregarding the Schwimmer case is that the Supreme Court, as
no one knows better than the Supreme Court itself, is not
bound by its previous decisions unless it chooses to be. If
the Court cites a case, it cannot allege that the case of its
own weight compels the Judges to do what they would not
otherwise have done. The Court frequently and bluntly
overrules itself, as it did quite recently in the Farmers Loan
& Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 9 even when, according to careful
critics, the new decision did not logically require such an
overruling. Therefore, if Justice Sutherland and the majority say they rely on the Schwimmer case,10 they can only
mean that they hold the views there promulgated, or that
they do not wish to go into the matter again. Either position is intelligible, and either would be a little more candid.
If "support," then, means what I have suggested it may
mean, and if a Draft Act exempting only conscientious objectors to all wars is an important act, likely to be passed
at some future time, Mr. MacIntosh was properly declared
to be inadmissible under the Naturalization Act, as it is
printed in Volume 34 of our Statutes at Large.
ButIt is at least equally reasonable to say that "support"
does not mean more than "obey," and that when an applicant swears he will "support and defend the Constitution
and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic," he is, as far as the laws are concerned,
merely asseverating solemnly what is a matter of course.
He is only asserting that he is an honest man and wishes
sincerely to become a citizen of this country. In that case,
the phrase is merely a heart-stirring ritual, not without emotional value, but not useful for our purposes.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930).

20 Supra note 9.
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Then all that the Naturalization Act demands-outside
of the specific requirements which are concededly met in this
instance-is that a candidate shall not wish to destroy this
country as a political unit or to change it into something
obviously and radically different from what it is. So much,
I think, of specific content can be found in the statutory
requirement. There may be a sacred right of revolution,
but the statute requires a man to forego it when he seeks to
become a citizen. Perhaps this should not be the case, but
the statute seems unmistakably to insist upon it.
And if we are to understand the statute in this way,
Justice Hughes' dissent becomes not merely the eloquent expression of a lofty and humane sentiment, but the assertion
of a sound legal doctrine. The statute is then a broad and
liberal one. It excludes anarchists and polygamists by name,
but otherwise asks only warranted good character and an
assurance that he who desires to become a member of this
particular civic organization, does not do so in order to destroy it. And if that is the statutory demand, who has
authorized commissioners and deputy commissioners, examiners and investigators, to draw up their puerile interrogatories and to limit and straighten with their mis-called
discretion the operation of a national law? Whence do the
mandarins of our Tape and Sealing-Wax Offices draw their
power to be discreet at the expense of their betters? Justice
Hughes asks these questions only by implication and with
the judicial reserve that befits him, but they are important;
and despite the fact that he speaks for a minority, one may
hope that they will be heeded.
Mr. MacIntosh is not to be our fellow-citizen. It is unfortunate, and I, for one, regret it. I should have been glad
to offer in exchange for him Mr. Capone who, I am sure, has
no conscientious scruples against bearing arms in any quarrel, or the recently honorable Mr. William Hale Thompson,
who is profoundly attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States. I am not at all sure that Mr.
MacIntosh was not legally excluded, in spite of the fact that
nearly every reason for excluding him, presented by the majority, is a poor one. He is not likely to be troubled much
by his exclusion, since he is a distinguished person and in
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all probability will not be bullied too much by our custom
officials and immigration inspectors.
And even if it was not strictly relevant, the debate between Justice Sutherland and Justice Hughes on the duty
to bear arms serves an excellent purpose. The integrity and
honesty of both are beyond question; but if any intelligent
person can read both opinions and be unable to pick the intellectually finer, and the morally more satisfactory one,
human judgments are more wantonly capricious than I like
to believe.
What would happen if a very large number of citizens
claim the right to refuse military service in a war they
thought unjust? The answer is very simple. Congress
should not declare war when a very large number of Americans believe it to be unjust.
MAx RADIN.
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